RBlock

Cryptography audits

20 firms with demonstrable cryptographic depth, and 170 of their public audit reports, research papers and tools. Read what a firm found on a system like yours before you hire it.

20 firms170 key works38 landmarksVerified November 2026

How to use it

  1. Open Key works and filter by the primitive you are building on.

  2. Read one or two past reports closest to your system: scope, depth and how findings are written.

  3. Shortlist two or three firms and compare them side by side.

20firms
11headquartered in Europe
170key works linked
38landmark works
Download all data (JSON)

atsec information security

Certification lab · Austin, United States & Munich, Germany · est. 2000 Vendors of cryptographic modules (HSMs, TEEs, OS crypto libraries, network appliances) that need FIPS 140-3 validation, algorithm testing, SP 800-90B entropy assessment or Common Criteria certification. $$$6 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose FIPS 140-3 / CC certificationImplementation auditEurope HQ

Accredited evaluation lab for FIPS 140-3 (CMVP), cryptographic algorithm and entropy-source testing, and Common Criteria.

Strengths

  • Large FIPS track record (its site links to 577 certificates)
  • Named as testing lab on NIST CMVP certificates for major vendors (Qualcomm, F5)
  • FIPS 140-3, algorithm testing, entropy-source assessment and Common Criteria under one roof
  • Offices in Austin, Munich, Stockholm, Rome and Beijing

Watch-outs

  • Conformance testing, not adversarial cryptanalysis or protocol design review
  • Timelines depend on NIST CMVP queues outside the lab's control
  • Not relevant for ZK, MPC or smart-contract projects

Key works

First ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithm testing via NIST ACVTS (2024)
Website
atsec.de
Type
Certification lab
Headquarters
Austin, United States & Munich, Germany (no single HQ stated)
Founded
2000
Size
201-1000 people
Typical engagement
FIPS 140-3 projects span months including the NIST CMVP queue; algorithm and entropy assessments are shorter.
Public reports
atsec.de
Europe
European offices in Munich (Germany), Stockholm (Sweden) and Rome (Italy).

Specialties

  • FIPS 140-3 / CC certification
  • Implementation audit

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Assembly
  • Java

Sources · verified November 2026

  1. atsec.de
  2. atsec.de
  3. csrc.nist.gov
  4. csrc.nist.gov

Anchor: #ca-atsec

ChainSecurity

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Zurich, Switzerland · est. 2017 EVM projects based in or selling to Europe whose scope mixes contracts with Plonky2 circuits or validator DKG tooling, and that want a Swiss auditor — not a first choice for pure cryptography reviews. $$$6 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Smart contractsZero-knowledge proofsMPC / threshold signaturesEurope HQ

ETH Zurich spin-off focused on smart-contract and protocol audits, with a small but real body of ZK-circuit (Plonky2) and DKG-tool audit work.

Strengths

  • Large public archive: 430 reports since 2017, per its site
  • Some ZK-circuit (Intmax Plonky2) and DKG-tool audit experience with public PDFs
  • Swiss base and ETH Zurich academic roots

Watch-outs

  • Cryptography is a minor share of public work; mostly smart-contract audits
  • No public reviews of standalone crypto libraries, PQC or hardware found
  • Site lists Decentralized Security AG (Zurich) as the entity; ChainSecurity was acquired by PwC Switzerland in 2020 — confirm the current contracting entity

Key works

  • 2025

    Intmax 2 ZKP circuits code assessment · IntmaxLandmark

    Soundness review of recursive Plonky2 rollup circuits (balance, validity, withdrawal); 7 criticals found and fixed.

    • ZK proofs
    Audit
  • 2023

    Herodotus CairoLib (MPT, MMR, Keccak) assessment · HerodotusLandmark

    Storage-proof primitives in Cairo; a critical MPT verify bug let forged keys pass. Useful for proof-of-state builders.

    • Hashing & commitments
    • Bridges & light clients
    • Cryptographic libraries
    Audit
  • 2024

    Plonky2 BN254 scalar-multiplication and Keccak256 circuits · Intmax

    Gadget-level review of non-native curve and Keccak circuits with cross-table lookups; 3 criticals fixed.

    • ZK proofs
    • Hashing & commitments
    • Cryptographic libraries
    Audit
  • 2024

    SSV-DKG tool limited code review · SSV Labs

    DKG tooling for distributed validators: missing result-signature check, TLS default, PKCS#1 v1.5 share encryption.

    • MPC / threshold signatures
    • Key management & HSM
    • TLS & secure channels
    Audit
  • 2023

    Herodotus on Starknet storage-proof contracts · Herodotus

    L1-to-Starknet header and fact registry review; an MMR flaw let proofs verify against inner nodes.

    • Hashing & commitments
    • Bridges & light clients
    Audit
  • 2023

    Chronicle Scribe Schnorr-aggregation oracle · Chronicle

    On-chain secp256k1 Schnorr multi-signature verification for oracles (scheme design itself out of scope).

    • Signatures
    • Smart-contract cryptography
    Audit
Intmax 2 ZKP circuits code assessment (2025); Herodotus CairoLib (MPT, MMR, Keccak) assessment (2023)
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Zurich, Switzerland
Founded
2017
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope smart-contract audits of weeks; repeat audits for large DeFi and stablecoin clients.
Public reports
chainsecurity.com
Europe
Headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland (Thurgauerstrasse 40).

Specialties

  • Smart contracts
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • MPC / threshold signatures

Languages reviewed

  • Solidity
  • Vyper
  • Rust
  • Go

Anchor: #ca-chainsecurity

Cure53

Security research firm with crypto practice · Berlin, Germany · est. 2007 Wallets, privacy and E2EE apps, and JS/TS, Rust or C++ crypto libraries (MPC, Shamir secret sharing, curve libraries) that want crypto review plus the surrounding app, extension and infra attack surface in one time-boxed engagement. $$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Implementation auditProtocol design reviewMPC / threshold signaturesWallets & key managementEurope HQ

Berlin security firm that publishes a large library of reports, including audits of cryptographic libraries (noble, ed25519, Monocypher), MPC/threshold code and end-to-end-encrypted apps alongside web and app pentests.

Strengths

  • Large public report library with many crypto-specific audits: MPC (Coinbase cb-mpc), ECDSA (Silence Labs), Shamir SSS (Privy), ed25519 and secp256k1 libraries, NIP-44
  • Recent crypto-library work for Coinbase cb-mpc and the widely used noble libraries
  • Can cover crypto together with app, browser-extension and infrastructure testing
  • Clients routinely publish the reports, so buyers can read past findings

Watch-outs

  • Primarily a web/app security firm; little public work on ZK circuits or proof systems
  • Short time-boxed engagements may limit depth on novel protocol design
  • Some engagements are published only as summary reports

Key works

noble-ciphers and noble-curves libraries audit (2024); rustls TLS library security review (2020)
Website
cure53.de
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
Berlin, Germany
Founded
2007
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Time-boxed, fixed-day audits with published (sometimes summary) reports; Ente's crypto design and code audit ran nine days, while Nym's multi-package review ran 56 working days with six testers.
Public reports
cure53.de
Europe
Headquartered in Berlin, Germany.

Specialties

  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Wallets & key management

Languages reviewed

  • TypeScript
  • JavaScript
  • Rust
  • C/C++
  • Go
  • Kotlin
  • Swift

Sources · verified November 2026

  1. cure53.de
  2. cure53.de
  3. nym.com
  4. cure53.de

Anchor: #ca-cure53

Galois

Applied cryptography specialist · Portland, Oregon, United States · est. 1999 Organisations that want mathematical proof that production crypto code (AES-GCM, SHA-2, HMAC, DRBG, ECDSA) matches its specification, wired into CI, or long-horizon R&D on MPC, FHE and ZK — rather than a classic pre-launch audit. $$$$8 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Formal verificationImplementation auditZero-knowledge proofsMPC / threshold signaturesFHE

R&D firm known for machine-checked verification of cryptographic code (Cryptol/SAW) and for advanced-cryptography research and engineering in ZK, MPC and FHE.

Strengths

  • Created Cryptol and SAW, used to prove AWS-LC and s2n code matches its specification
  • Proofs can run in CI so they are re-checked on every code change (s2n, AWS-LC-Verification with AWS)
  • Deep MPC/ZK/FHE research base: DARPA SIEVE (ZK), Swanky (MPC), BASALISC (FHE hardware accelerator)
  • Strong fit for high-assurance government and infrastructure buyers

Watch-outs

  • Not a classic audit shop; no public audit-report library to compare findings
  • Engagements skew to long R&D/verification projects; less suited to a quick pre-launch review
  • US offices only (Portland, Arlington, Minneapolis, Dayton); no European presence found

Key works

Verified Cryptographic Code for Everybody: SAW proofs of AES-256-GCM and SHA-384 in AWS-LC (2021); blst BLS12-381 library formal verification (2020)
Website
galois.com
Type
Applied cryptography specialist
Headquarters
Portland, Oregon, United States
Founded
1999
Size
201-1000 people
Typical engagement
Verification and R&D projects measured in months (the AWS-LC AES-GCM/SHA-384 proofs took about six calendar months); often government- or large-enterprise-funded.

Specialties

  • Formal verification
  • Implementation audit
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • FHE
  • Post-quantum
  • Side-channel & hardware

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Rust
  • Haskell
  • x86 assembly
  • Cryptol

Open-source tools

  • Cryptol
  • SAW (Software Analysis Workbench)
  • Swanky (MPC libraries)
  • Diet Mac'n'Cheese (ZK backend)

Anchor: #ca-galois

Keysight (Riscure)

Hardware & side-channel lab · Delft, Netherlands · est. 2001 Chip, secure-element, HSM and hardware-wallet makers needing side-channel/fault-injection testing of crypto implementations (including ML-DSA) or PSA Certified evaluations. $$$$7 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Side-channel & hardwarePost-quantumFIPS 140-3 / CC certificationImplementation auditEurope HQ

Riscure, founded in Delft in 2001 and acquired by Keysight in 2024, is a device-security lab and tool vendor for side-channel, fault-injection and certification evaluations, including of post-quantum implementations.

Strengths

  • Hands-on side-channel and fault-injection testing; Keysight's lab completed what it calls the first PSA Certified Level 4 evaluation (2025)
  • Measured ML-DSA leakage at three protection levels with NXP; Inspector added PQC (Dilithium) testing in 2024
  • Combines evaluation services with widely used commercial test tooling
  • Long-standing Dutch lab (Delft, since 2001)

Watch-outs

  • Hardware/device focus; not suited to protocol, ZK or smart-contract review
  • Client reports are confidential; little public evidence to compare depth
  • Now part of a large test-and-measurement corporation; procurement can be heavier

Key works

SiXG301 Series 3 Secure Vault, PSA Certified Level 4 evaluation (2025); Bypassing secure boot using fault injection (Black Hat EU 2016) (2016)
Type
Hardware & side-channel lab
Headquarters
Delft, Netherlands (Riscure lab; part of Keysight Technologies)
Founded
2001
Size
201-1000 people
Typical engagement
Lab evaluations and certification projects of weeks to months; test tooling (Inspector) sold separately.
Europe
Riscure lab based in Delft, Netherlands.

Specialties

  • Side-channel & hardware
  • Post-quantum
  • FIPS 140-3 / CC certification
  • Implementation audit

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Assembly
  • Hardware/RTL

Anchor: #ca-keysight-riscure

Kudelski Security

Security research firm with crypto practice · Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, Switzerland · est. 2012 Custody, wallet and validator teams that need a review of a threshold ECDSA/EdDSA (MPC) or DKG library, or of a novel scheme such as timelock encryption, from a European firm with in-house cryptographers. $$$9 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Implementation auditProtocol design reviewMPC / threshold signaturesSmart contractsPost-quantumEurope HQ

Cybersecurity division of the Swiss Kudelski Group with a long-standing cryptography team that publishes code reviews of threshold-signature (CGGMP, GG18/20, FROST) libraries, timelock encryption and blockchain systems.

Strengths

  • Repeated public work on threshold-signature libraries: ING ecdsa-mpc (2021), AMIS CGGMP/FROST (2022); its archive also lists Lit Protocol FROST, Uniwire TSS and Ava Labs threshold-signature reviews
  • Cryptographers teach crypto code auditing publicly (NIST CSRC talk 'A Hitchhiker's Guide to Cryptography Code Audit', Jan 2024; Eurocrypt 2024 affiliated workshop)
  • Public blockchain report archive of about 120 reports with service and language filters
  • Swiss headquarters with offices across Europe, the US and Asia

Watch-outs

  • Public archive is weighted toward blockchain code reviews; few public ZK-circuit audits compared with ZK specialists
  • Cryptography is a small part of a 400+-person managed-security business; confirm reviewer seniority
  • Some archive entries did not open as individual pages when checked; ask for the PDF of any report you want to rely on

Key works

Polynonce: a novel ECDSA nonce-recurrence attack (2023); Binance tss-lib threshold ECDSA security audit (2019)
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, Switzerland
Founded
2012
Size
201-1000 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope cryptographic secure code reviews of a few weeks, sold alongside a much larger managed-security and consulting business.
Public reports
kudelskisecurity.com
Europe
International HQ in Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne (Switzerland) plus offices in Adliswil, Madrid, Paris, Munich and London.

Specialties

  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Smart contracts
  • Post-quantum

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • Solidity
  • ink!

Anchor: #ca-kudelski-security

Least Authority

Applied cryptography specialist · Berlin, Germany · est. 2011 Open-source and Web3 teams that need an audit of a cryptographic library or prover — BLS/Ed25519/secp256k1 signature code, gnark/GKR provers, DKG or privacy-protocol cryptography — with a published final report. $$$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Implementation auditProtocol design reviewZero-knowledge proofsMPC / threshold signaturesSmart contractsEurope HQ

Berlin-based, privacy-focused security consultancy with a deep record auditing cryptographic libraries, signature schemes and ZK provers, mostly for open-source and Web3 clients.

Strengths

  • Sustained cryptographic-library and prover work: gnark GKR (2024), Linea Limitless Prover (2025), Anza BLS and Ed25519 (2026)
  • Publishes final reports with remediation status on a public audits page (about 90 listed, 2020–2026)
  • Published the MoonMath Manual to zk-SNARKs (2022)
  • German entity (Least Authority TFA GmbH) plus US and Singapore subsidiaries

Watch-outs

  • Small team; capacity for large or urgent programmes can be limited
  • Little public tooling compared with larger research firms
  • Client base is mostly Web3/FOSS; few public enterprise or hardware crypto reviews

Key works

Plonky3 STARK toolkit audit (2024); gnark and gnark-crypto audit for the Linea prover (phase 1) (2024)
Type
Applied cryptography specialist
Headquarters
Berlin, Germany
Founded
2011
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope audits ending in a published final report that records remediation status; repeat multi-phase work is common (e.g. several Linea prover phases).
Public reports
leastauthority.com
Europe
Relocated to Berlin in 2016; operates as Least Authority TFA GmbH (Germany) with a largely remote team.

Specialties

  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Smart contracts
  • Wallets & key management

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • Solidity
  • TypeScript

Open-source tools

  • MoonMath Manual (ZK-SNARK educational resource)

Anchor: #ca-least-authority

NCC Group (Cryptography Services)

Security research firm with crypto practice · Manchester, United Kingdom · est. 1999 Protocol and enterprise teams that want an established consultancy for a fixed-scope review of a crypto library or protocol (signatures, ZK circuits, MPC) — especially when the same vendor must also cover pentest, hardware or assurance work. $$$$9 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Protocol design reviewImplementation auditZero-knowledge proofsMPC / threshold signaturesPost-quantumEurope HQ

Large listed security consultancy whose Cryptography Services team reviews cryptographic protocols and implementations, from ZK circuits and threshold ECDSA to BLS signature libraries and post-quantum readiness.

Strengths

  • Dedicated Cryptography Services team with public reviews spanning ZK circuits (Penumbra R1CS, Zcash Orchard), threshold ECDSA (Qredo/Milagro) and signature libraries (Anza BLS12-381, 2026)
  • Reports state scope, commit and effort (consultants, person-days), which helps buyers benchmark proposals
  • Can bundle crypto review with pentest, hardware and assurance services from one vendor
  • 2025 research report cites Cryptography Services work on post-quantum migration, threshold signatures and secure messaging

Watch-outs

  • Large-consultancy procurement and pricing relative to crypto boutiques
  • Public output is modest in volume (NCC reports 8 public reports firm-wide for 2025), so fewer recent examples to compare than high-volume ZK boutiques
  • Crypto team is one practice inside a ~2,000-person firm; ask which named cryptographers will be staffed

Key works

Zcash NU5 (Orchard) cryptography review (2021); BLST BLS12-381 library cryptographic implementation review (2021)
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
Manchester, United Kingdom
Founded
1999
Size
1001-10000 people
Typical engagement
Short, fixed-scope reviews are common in its public reports: Anza BLS (2026) was 2 consultants / 6 person-days; Penumbra R1CS (2023) was 3 consultants / 20 person-days over two weeks. Larger multi-phase programmes are also offered.
Public reports
nccgroup.com
Europe
UK headquarters (Manchester) with European operations including Fox-IT in the Netherlands. NCC sold its separate Dutch Fox Crypto B.V. unit to CR Group Nordic in March 2025 (EUR 78.5m); the Cryptography Services consulting practice was not part of that sale.

Specialties

  • Protocol design review
  • Implementation audit
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Post-quantum
  • Side-channel & hardware
  • Smart contracts

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • C/C++
  • Java
  • OCaml

Anchor: #ca-ncc-group-cryptography-services

Nethermind Security

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · London, United Kingdom · est. 2017 Rollups and zkVM-based apps (SP1, RISC Zero, Noir, Cairo) that want ZK circuit plus verifier audits, optionally with EasyCrypt/Lean formal verification, from a London-based Ethereum core-infrastructure team; also MPC/OPRF-style identity components. $$$8 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Zero-knowledge proofsFormal verificationSmart contractsImplementation auditMPC / threshold signaturesEurope HQ

Security arm of Ethereum infrastructure company Nethermind, doing ZK and smart-contract audits plus formal verification of on-chain proof verifiers.

Strengths

  • Proved ZKsync's ~1,700-line Yul verifier conforms to a PLONK/plookup specification in EasyCrypt
  • ZK audits across Noir, Circom, Cairo, SP1 and RISC Zero (e.g. Lido's SP1 zk-oracle, 2025)
  • Cryptographic findings in identity infrastructure, e.g. World ID nullifier review flagged non-constant-time field arithmetic and Lagrange-coefficient checks (2026)
  • Parent builds Ethereum client software; London HQ suits European buyers

Watch-outs

  • Public report repository has terse file names and no index, making comparison harder
  • Formal-verification scope can be partial (ZKsync: soundness, completeness and zero-knowledge not proven)
  • Ethereum/Starknet-centric; little enterprise or PQC work

Key works

World ID OPRF nullifier (threshold/secret-sharing) review (2026); Formal verification of the ZKsync PLONK verifier in EasyCrypt (2025)
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
London, United Kingdom
Founded
2017
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Audits of weeks; formal-verification projects of months (ZKsync verifier: about 2.5 months).
Public reports
github.com
Europe
Headquartered in London, United Kingdom.

Specialties

  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Formal verification
  • Smart contracts
  • Implementation audit
  • MPC / threshold signatures

Languages reviewed

  • Solidity
  • Yul
  • Cairo
  • Noir
  • Circom
  • Rust
  • o1js (TypeScript)

Open-source tools

  • zksync-verification (EasyCrypt model)
  • Clear (Lean framework for Yul)

Anchor: #ca-nethermind-security

OpenZeppelin

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Not publicly stated · est. 2015 Rollup and L1/L2 teams that need on-chain verifier and prover review (PLONK/KZG, Fiat-Shamir transcripts) alongside contract audits from one established Web3 firm. $$$8 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Smart contractsZero-knowledge proofsProtocol design reviewImplementation audit

Major smart-contract security firm and library maintainer with a dedicated ZKP practice (launched Dec 2023) reviewing PLONK provers, verifiers and circuits; S&P Global agreed to acquire it in Sept 2026.

Strengths

  • Dedicated ZKP practice covering PLONK-style systems, KZG, FRI, Fiat-Shamir and recursive proofs
  • Found a critical Fiat-Shamir transcript flaw (proof forgery) in Linea's PLONK verifier (2023 public report)
  • Reviewed gnark's PLONK prover for zero-knowledge properties, finding missing blinding of quotient shards (High, resolved; 2024)
  • Maintains OpenZeppelin Contracts, the most widely used Solidity library

Watch-outs

  • Primarily a smart-contract firm; few public pure-cryptography library audits outside Web3
  • S&P Global agreed to acquire OpenZeppelin (announced 17 Sept 2026, subject to closing); it is to run as a standalone unit — confirm contracting terms
  • Public research listing shows recent reports only; older ZK reports must be found individually

Key works

Linea gnark PLONK prover backend and verifier audit (2024); OpenZeppelin Contracts cryptography utilities (2024)
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Not publicly stated (remote team; site entity Zeppelin Group Ltd)
Founded
2015
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Multi-week audits with fix review (Linea prover 2024: about four weeks). No first-party rate card; request a scoped quote.
Public reports
openzeppelin.com

Specialties

  • Smart contracts
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Protocol design review
  • Implementation audit

Languages reviewed

  • Solidity
  • Cairo
  • Circom
  • Noir
  • Rust
  • Leo
  • o1js (TypeScript)
  • Go

Open-source tools

  • OpenZeppelin Contracts

Anchor: #ca-openzeppelin

OtterSec

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Not publicly stated Solana and Move ecosystem teams needing contract plus ZK-adjacent review (confidential tokens, zkLogin-style circuits, threshold signing for bridges) from an ecosystem-trusted auditor. $$$7 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Smart contractsZero-knowledge proofsWallets & key managementMPC / threshold signatures

Blockchain auditor strong in Solana, Sui and Aptos, with public reports on Solana's ZK token SDK, Sui zkLogin circuits and WSTS threshold signatures.

Strengths

  • Deep Solana/Move expertise; states that it maintains the Anchor framework
  • Public reports on ZK-adjacent systems (Solana zk-token-sdk, Sui zkLogin, Light Protocol) and WSTS threshold signing
  • Named by Solana as one of three firms that reviewed the 2025 ZK ElGamal Proof program fix
  • Strong CTF and exploit-research culture

Watch-outs

  • Few cryptography-specific research publications compared with applied-crypto boutiques
  • Solana's May 2025 post-mortem on a Fiat-Shamir bug in the ZK ElGamal Proof program links OtterSec's 2023 audit of that code — a reminder that audits do not guarantee security
  • No stated HQ, founding year or headcount; confirm team staffing

Key works

  • 2026

    Unfaithful claims: breaking 6 zkVMsLandmark

    Fiat-Shamir transcript gaps in Jolt, Nexus, Ceno, Expander, Binius64 and Cairo-M verifiers allowed false proofs.

    • ZK proofs
    • Hashing & commitments
    Vulnerability disclosure
  • 2026

    Unverified evaluations in Dusk's PLONK · Dusk Network

    Verifier trusted prover-supplied selector evaluations, enabling forged proofs and minting; shows verifier-level depth.

    • ZK proofs
    • Hashing & commitments
    Vulnerability disclosure
  • 2025

    Stacks WSTS cryptography review · Stacks

    Listed on OtterSec's public reports index (osec.io/reports) under this title and date.

    • MPC / threshold signatures
    • Signatures
    Audit
  • 2024

    ZK Compression v1 audit (incl. groth16-solana) · Light Protocol

    Audit of Solana ZK Compression programs with the groth16-solana verifier crate in scope; 30 findings reported.

    • ZK proofs
    • Hashing & commitments
    Audit
  • 2024

    Celestia BlobstreamX security assessment · Celestia

    Contract-level review of BlobstreamX (gateway, function registry); two informational findings. Circuits not named in scope.

    • Bridges & light clients
    • Smart-contract cryptography
    Audit
  • 2023

    zk-token-sdk (confidential transfers) audit · Solana Foundation

    ElGamal and sigma-proof library behind Token-2022 confidential transfers; two critical fee-proof findings.

    • ZK proofs
    • Cryptographic libraries
    Audit
  • 2023

    Mysten zkLogin review · Mysten Labs

    Listed on OtterSec's public reports index (osec.io/reports) under this title and date.

    • ZK proofs
    Audit
Unfaithful claims: breaking 6 zkVMs (2026)
Website
osec.io
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Not publicly stated (operating entity Otter Audits LLC)
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope audits of weeks; also reviews emergency patches for ecosystem incidents (e.g. Solana's May 2025 ZK ElGamal fix).
Public reports
osec.io

Specialties

  • Smart contracts
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Wallets & key management
  • MPC / threshold signatures

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Move
  • Solidity
  • TypeScript

Open-source tools

  • Anchor (Solana framework; OtterSec states it maintains it)
  • bn-ebpf-solana (sBPF Binary Ninja plugin)

Sources · verified November 2026

  1. osec.io
  2. osec.io
  3. solana.com
  4. github.com
  5. sui.io

Anchor: #ca-ottersec

PQShield (advisory)

Applied cryptography specialist · Oxford, United Kingdom · est. 2018 Enterprises, critical-infrastructure operators and chip makers planning a post-quantum migration (crypto inventory, ML-KEM/ML-DSA roadmap) who want advice from PQC specialists — not a code audit. $$$7 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Post-quantumProtocol design reviewSide-channel & hardwareFormal verificationEurope HQ

Oxford University spin-out selling post-quantum cryptography IP whose advisory arm is in the UK NCSC's assured-consultancy PQC pilot for discovery, migration planning and advice.

Strengths

  • Selected for the UK NCSC Assured Cyber Security Consultancy PQC pilot in both categories (Discovery & Migration Planning; Advice), Sept 2025
  • Team wrote CRYPTREC's ML-KEM evaluation report and co-authors formal-verification work on ML-KEM
  • Hardware/firmware PQC IP experience relevant to side-channel-aware migration
  • Named customers/partners include AMD, Microchip, Lattice Semiconductor, Collins Aerospace and NTT Data

Watch-outs

  • Advisory and IP vendor, not an audit firm; no public audit-report library
  • Advice may touch on its own PQC products; ask how independence is handled
  • Narrow focus: no ZK, MPC or smart-contract work

Key works

CRYPTREC ML-KEM evaluation report (CRYPTREC-EX-3502-2025) (2025); Falcon signature scheme (basis of NIST FN-DSA) (2017)
Type
Applied cryptography specialist
Headquarters
Oxford, United Kingdom
Founded
2018
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Advisory programmes (discovery of the cryptographic estate, migration roadmap, standards-aligned advice), with partners such as Capgemini, CGI, Roke and TCS for larger programmes.
Europe
UK company (Oxford spin-out); NCSC-assured PQC consultancy pilot for UK critical national infrastructure.

Specialties

  • Post-quantum
  • Protocol design review
  • Side-channel & hardware
  • Formal verification

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Assembly
  • Jasmin
  • Verilog

Anchor: #ca-pqshield

Quarkslab

Security research firm with crypto practice · Paris, France · est. 2011 Maintainers of C/C++ or Python crypto and protocol libraries (TLS, SSH, disk encryption) and teams shipping post-quantum or embedded crypto that want a European, research-led implementation audit — often OSTIF-funded for open source. $$$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Implementation auditPost-quantumSide-channel & hardwareProtocol design reviewEurope HQ

French security research firm (now part of Airbus Defence and Space) with a cryptography team that audits TLS/SSH and crypto libraries, evaluates privacy-coin cryptography and tests post-quantum implementations.

Strengths

  • Hands-on audits of core crypto libraries with public reports: Mbed TLS 4.0/TF-PSA-Crypto (2026), Paramiko (2025–26), VeraCrypt (2016), Monero Bulletproofs (2018)
  • Publishes crypto-condor, an Apache-2.0 tool for testing primitive implementations against test vectors, including ML-KEM and ML-DSA
  • Active post-quantum implementation research (HQC reference-implementation bugs, CVE-2024-54137; differential fuzzing of LibOQS and Bouncy Castle)
  • French research culture with reverse-engineering and hardware depth

Watch-outs

  • Little public ZK, MPC or smart-contract cryptography work
  • Fewer public reports per year than high-volume crypto boutiques
  • Acquired by Airbus Defence and Space (completed 1 Oct 2026); ask how this affects availability, pricing and independence for your engagement

Key works

Mbed TLS 4.0 and TF-PSA-Crypto security audit (2026); MIFARE Classic static encrypted nonce and hardware backdoors (2024)
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
Paris, France
Founded
2011
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope library or product audits of several weeks with a public report when the client agrees; open-source work is often funded through OSTIF (Mbed TLS 2026: two engineers).
Public reports
github.com
Europe
Registered office in Paris (Quarkslab SAS, 10 boulevard Haussmann); most of its ~100 staff are in Paris and Rennes. Part of Airbus Defence and Space since October 2026.

Specialties

  • Implementation audit
  • Post-quantum
  • Side-channel & hardware
  • Protocol design review

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Python
  • Rust
  • Go

Open-source tools

  • crypto-condor (compliance testing of primitive implementations, incl. ML-KEM/ML-DSA)

Anchor: #ca-quarkslab

Sigma Prime

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Sydney, Australia · est. 2016 Ethereum consensus, staking and rollup teams needing review of BLS/KZG code or zkVM-based consensus proofs by reviewers who also build core protocol software; budget-ready ZK projects (published floor applies). $$$$9 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Protocol design reviewImplementation auditZero-knowledge proofsSmart contractsWallets & key management

Ethereum infrastructure and security firm (builder of the Lighthouse consensus client) auditing protocols, KZG/BLS cryptography, zkVM programs and ZK circuits.

Strengths

  • Builds and maintains Lighthouse, giving first-hand Ethereum consensus and BLS expertise
  • Public reviews of Ethereum's KZG ceremony and the c-kzg-4844/go-kzg-4844 libraries
  • ZK audit service covering Circom, Halo2, Cairo, Plonky2 and Noir, plus zkVM work (RISC Zero, Polygon zkEVM)
  • Publishes a ZK pricing floor, which helps budgeting

Watch-outs

  • High published floor for ZK audits (from US$150k)
  • Ethereum-centric; little public non-blockchain crypto work
  • Sydney base; check time-zone overlap for European and US teams

Key works

  • 2023

    c-kzg-4844 and go-kzg-4844 libraries review · Ethereum FoundationLandmark

    Pre-Dencun review of the C and Go KZG libraries Ethereum clients use for blobs; found a BLS12-381 point deserialisation bug.

    • Hashing & commitments
    • Cryptographic libraries
    Audit
  • 2020

    drand distributed randomness beacon review · Protocol Labs (Filecoin)Landmark

    Threshold-BLS beacon and DKG review; found a rogue-key attack and a replay attack enabling node eviction in the DKG.

    • Randomness
    • MPC / threshold signatures
    • Signatures
    Audit
  • 2026

    On-chain BLS library review · Lido

    Review of Lido's Solidity BLS12-381 library for verifying validator deposit signatures; scope limited to BLS.sol.

    • Signatures
    • Smart-contract cryptography
    Audit
  • 2025

    The Signal: Ethereum consensus circuits review · RISC Zero

    zkVM proofs of Casper FFG finality; pairs consensus-client expertise with ZK light-client review.

    • ZK proofs
    • Bridges & light clients
    • Signatures
    Audit
  • 2025

    Clementine BitVM2 bridge review · Chainway Labs

    Bitcoin bridge using BitVM2, MuSig2 and Winternitz keys; covers unverified light-client proof risks.

    • Bridges & light clients
    • Signatures
    • ZK proofs
    Audit
  • 2025

    SP1 and zkVMs: a security auditor's guide

    Checklist for reviewing SP1/RISC-V guest programs: input validation, 32-bit pitfalls, verification-key handling.

    • ZK proofs
    Research
  • 2023

    Charon distributed validator protocol review · Obol

    Threshold BLS validator middleware; flagged missing commitment-length checks in the Kryptology DKG dependency.

    • MPC / threshold signatures
    • Signatures
    Audit
  • 2023

    DC4BC batch BLSToExecutionChange signing review · Lido

    Review of the threshold-BLS DKG tooling Lido used to sign its validators' BLSToExecutionChange messages.

    • MPC / threshold signatures
    • Key management & HSM
    Audit
  • 2022

    KZG Powers of Tau ceremony review · Ethereum Foundation

    Review of the EIP-4844 trusted-setup sequencer; relevant to anyone running a public setup ceremony.

    • Hashing & commitments
    • Randomness
    Audit
c-kzg-4844 and go-kzg-4844 libraries review (2023); drand distributed randomness beacon review (2020)
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Sydney, Australia
Founded
2016
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
First-party: 'ZK audits start at US$150,000 and scale with circuit complexity'; engagements begin with a week of spec-building.
Public reports
github.com

Specialties

  • Protocol design review
  • Implementation audit
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Smart contracts
  • Wallets & key management

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • C
  • Solidity
  • Circom
  • Halo2
  • Noir
  • Cairo

Open-source tools

  • Lighthouse (Ethereum consensus client)
  • Anchor (SSV client)

Anchor: #ca-sigma-prime

Spearbit / Cantina

Audit contest platform · Miami, Florida, United States · est. 2021 Web3 teams that want a hand-picked researcher team for a ZK circuit library or protocol (Halo2, Barretenberg) as part of a broader contract review, and can vet the named researchers' crypto record themselves. $$$$8 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Smart contractsZero-knowledge proofsImplementation audit

Spearbit is a curated network of independent security researchers; Cantina, which grew out of it, now sells researcher-led and AI-assisted reviews, competitions and bug bounties.

Strengths

  • Network model lets clients match named researchers to a ZK, L1/L2 or DeFi stack
  • One of three firms Aztec chose for its comparative bigfield audit; its report included two of the three issues Aztec graded Critical (engagements differed in length and scope)
  • Managed reviews, competitions and bounties available under one platform
  • Stated process ends with a final verification audit of fixes

Watch-outs

  • Reviewer quality depends on who is staffed; ask for named researchers and their cryptography record
  • Few public, cryptography-specific reports; little non-blockchain crypto work
  • Brand and site moved from cantina.xyz to cantina.security with an AI-native review offering; confirm what is human-led in your scope

Key works

Axiom circuits security review (halo2-lib, axiom-eth) (2024); Polygon zkEVM: Protocol (ROM and prover), engagement 1 (2022)
Type
Audit contest platform
Headquarters
Miami, Florida, United States
Founded
2021
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Team reviews scoped by codebase complexity and required expertise (no public rate card), plus fixed-window competitions with prize pools and ongoing bounties.

Specialties

  • Smart contracts
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Implementation audit

Languages reviewed

  • Solidity
  • Rust
  • Halo2
  • C++
  • Go

Anchor: #ca-spearbit-cantina

Trail of Bits

Security research firm with crypto practice · New York, United States · est. 2012 Teams shipping novel or high-value cryptography — threshold ECDSA/MPC wallets, ZK proof systems, post-quantum signatures, standard-library crypto — that want design review plus code review, with custom tooling, before mainnet or a major release. $$$$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Protocol design reviewImplementation auditZero-knowledge proofsMPC / threshold signaturesPost-quantum

Security research and engineering firm with a dedicated cryptography team doing design assessments, code reviews and cryptographic engineering, backed by one of the largest public report archives.

Strengths

  • Dedicated cryptography team; the firm states half the team holds PhDs in cryptography
  • Large public archive on GitHub with a separate 'Cryptography Reviews' section, including 2025–2026 reports on threshold ECDSA (NEAR One), Google's Go crypto libraries and ML-DSA/XMSS (QRL)
  • Builds widely used open-source tools, e.g. Circomspect for Circom circuits and Slither/Echidna for Solidity
  • Published research on proof-system weaknesses: 'Weak Fiat-Shamir Attacks on Modern Proof Systems' (IEEE S&P 2023, ToB co-authors)

Watch-outs

  • Premium-priced consultancy; budget accordingly and compare scoped quotes
  • Broad firm (AppSec, blockchain, AI); confirm the cryptography team itself is staffed on your engagement
  • In-demand staff can mean longer lead times; plan bookings early

Key works

Go cryptographic libraries security assessment (2025); Frozen Heart: weak Fiat-Shamir in Girault, Bulletproofs and PlonK (2022)
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
New York, United States
Founded
2012
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Multi-week design and code assessments staffed by named engineers, usually followed by a fix review (e.g. QRL fixes were reviewed about a month after the main assessment). Ask for a quote; no first-party rate card is published.
Public reports
github.com

Specialties

  • Protocol design review
  • Implementation audit
  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Post-quantum
  • Smart contracts
  • Wallets & key management

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • C/C++
  • Python
  • TypeScript
  • Solidity
  • Circom

Open-source tools

  • Circomspect
  • ZKDocs
  • Slither
  • Echidna
  • Medusa

Anchor: #ca-trail-of-bits

Veridise

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Austin, Texas, United States · est. 2021 zkVM, ZK-circuit and ZK-coprocessor teams (RISC Zero, ZKsync Airbender, Halo2/Circom/gnark circuits) that want tool-assisted audits focused on under-constrained circuits, pre-launch or as recurring CI-integrated review. $$$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Zero-knowledge proofsSmart contractsFormal verificationImplementation audit

Blockchain auditor with a strong ZK practice that pairs manual review with in-house verification tooling such as the Picus under-constraint checker.

Strengths

  • Large public ZK audit archive covering zkVMs, precompiles and circuits (RISC Zero, ZKsync Airbender, Monero FCMP++, Succinct)
  • Picus formally checks circuit determinism; in a 2025 preliminary engagement it proved determinism for 11 SP1 operations
  • Published data from 100 audits: 55% of its ZK audits had a critical issue vs 27.5% of other audits (The Block, Jul 2024)
  • Academic formal-methods roots; publishes papers and conference talks on ZK verification

Watch-outs

  • Focus is blockchain/ZK; little public work on TLS, PQC or enterprise cryptography
  • Small team (about 40 staff per Built In); capacity can be constrained
  • Many archive reports are smart-contract scope; confirm ZK specialists are staffed

Key works

RISC Zero zkVM V2 circuits, recursion and prover audit (2025); Automated detection of under-constrained ZK circuits (QED², PLDI 2023) (2023)
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Austin, Texas, United States
Founded
2021
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope ZK and contract audits of a few weeks (ChainSafe BLS: under two weeks) up to multi-month zkVM programmes (RISC Zero: July–December 2024); repeat engagements are common.
Public reports
veridise.com

Specialties

  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Smart contracts
  • Formal verification
  • Implementation audit

Languages reviewed

  • Circom
  • Halo2 (Rust)
  • Rust
  • Solidity
  • Leo
  • o1js (TypeScript)
  • gnark (Go)

Open-source tools

  • Picus (ZK circuit under-constraint checker)
  • LLZK (circuit IR)

Anchor: #ca-veridise

X41 D-Sec

Security research firm with crypto practice · Aachen, Germany Projects whose cryptographic risk sits in protocol and signing code — secure messengers, software-update and supply-chain signing (TUF/in-toto), QUIC/TLS stacks, VPN clients — and that want a German code-audit firm with public reports. $$9 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Implementation auditProtocol design reviewWallets & key managementEurope HQ

German source-code audit firm whose public reports include messenger cryptography (Wire/Proteus), a post-quantum ledger (QRL), software-update signing frameworks (TUF, in-toto) and QUIC libraries.

Strengths

  • Many public source-code audit reports, including signing frameworks (TUF, go-tuf, in-toto, RSTUF) and QUIC libraries
  • Messenger and ledger cryptography reviews: Wire Proteus (2017, with Kudelski Security) and QRL (2018)
  • Steady VPN-client audit work (Mullvad 2024 and 2026, AzireVPN/Malwarebytes 2026), useful when crypto sits inside a larger client app
  • German base with offices in Aachen and Frankfurt

Watch-outs

  • Generalist code-audit firm; little public ZK, MPC or post-quantum-specific work
  • Most messenger/ledger cryptography reviews are older (2017–2018); the 2024 Mullvad app report did not put tunnel cryptography in scope
  • Small team; founding year and headcount are not published

Key works

nghttp3 and ngtcp2 (QUIC / HTTP/3) source code audit (2025); The Update Framework (TUF) source code audit (2022)
Type
Security research firm with crypto practice
Headquarters
Aachen, Germany
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Time-boxed source-code audits of roughly 2–5 weeks with public reports (TUF 2022: two weeks of testing; ngtcp2/nghttp3 2025: about five weeks); frequent OSTIF-funded open-source work.
Public reports
x41-dsec.de
Europe
Headquartered in Aachen, Germany, with an office in Frankfurt.

Specialties

  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review
  • Wallets & key management

Languages reviewed

  • C/C++
  • Rust
  • Go
  • Python
  • Java

Open-source tools

  • BeanStack (Java fingerprinting)

Anchor: #ca-x41-d-sec

Zellic

Blockchain & smart-contract auditor · Not publicly stated · est. 2021 ZK rollups, proof aggregators, ZK light clients and privacy-coin teams (Zcash Sapling/Orchard, librustzcash) that want a high-volume Web3 auditor with ZK and applied-crypto depth. $$$9 key worksMedium confidenceDetailsClose Zero-knowledge proofsSmart contractsImplementation auditProtocol design review

Vulnerability-research firm founded by CTF players, with substantial public ZK and applied-cryptography audit output across zkEVMs, proof aggregators, ZK light clients and Zcash.

Strengths

  • Public reports on major ZK systems: Scroll zkEVM circuits, SP1 design review, Barretenberg bigfield, Nebra UPA circuits, Blobstream X
  • Recent Zcash cryptography work in 2026 (Sapling, librustzcash and further Zcash reports)
  • One of three firms Aztec chose for a side-by-side bigfield audit (2024)
  • Team background in top-ranked CTF competition; site lists applied cryptography and ZK circuits among core specialisms

Watch-outs

  • Web3-centric; little public work on TLS, PQC or enterprise crypto
  • Headquarters and headcount are not stated on its site; confirm contracting entity and staffing
  • Code4rena, the contest platform Zellic acquired in 2024, announced in May 2026 that it is winding down; do not assume a contest add-on is available

Key works

Zcash Sapling cryptographic security assessment (2026); Scroll zkEVM circuits, Part 1 (with KALOS) (2023)
Website
zellic.io
Type
Blockchain & smart-contract auditor
Headquarters
Not publicly stated
Founded
2021
Size
51-200 people
Typical engagement
Consultative audits of a few weeks with a public PDF report when the client agrees.
Public reports
github.com

Specialties

  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Smart contracts
  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Go
  • C++
  • Solidity
  • Move
  • Circom
  • Halo2

Anchor: #ca-zellic

zkSecurity

Applied cryptography specialist · Not publicly stated · est. 2023 ZK rollups, zkVMs, proof-system and circuit-heavy projects (Circom, Cairo, Halo2, gnark, STARK verifiers) that need proof-system soundness specialists before launch or a major upgrade; also confidential-transfer and encrypted-mempool designs. $$$10 key worksHigh confidenceDetailsClose Zero-knowledge proofsImplementation auditProtocol design reviewMPC / threshold signaturesFormal verification

Cryptography-focused firm launched in May 2023 that audits and builds ZK proof systems, zkVMs, circuits, KZG libraries and other advanced cryptography, with a high volume of public reports.

Strengths

  • Very high public output: 67 reports listed on its reports site, 12 of them dated 2026
  • Covers proof systems, zkVMs, KZG libraries and Circom/Cairo circuits, plus confidential-asset and encrypted-mempool designs (Aptos, 2026)
  • In Aztec's three-firm comparative bigfield audit, its report included all three issues Aztec graded Critical (engagement lengths and scopes differed between firms, per Aztec's issue-comparison table)
  • Also does development and formal-verification work (e.g. the Lean-based 'clean' circuit DSL), not only audits

Watch-outs

  • Young firm (launched 2023) with a small team (about 15 engineers including interns, per a Sept 2024 founder post)
  • Strong ZK/Web3 focus; few public enterprise, TLS or hardware crypto reviews
  • Headquarters and legal entity are not stated on its site; confirm the contracting entity

Key works

PeerDAS KZG libraries audit (blst, c-kzg-4844, rust-eth-kzg, go-eth-kzg) (2025); zkLogin circuits and trusted-setup ceremony audit (2023)
Type
Applied cryptography specialist
Headquarters
Not publicly stated (remote team)
Founded
2023
Size
1-50 people
Typical engagement
Fixed-scope audits of a few weeks (e.g. Stwo-Cairo verifier: 3 weeks; PeerDAS KZG: 4 weeks), with frequent repeat or multi-phase engagements (OpenVM 2.0 ran in four phases).

Specialties

  • Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Implementation audit
  • Protocol design review
  • MPC / threshold signatures
  • Formal verification
  • Smart contracts

Languages reviewed

  • Rust
  • Circom
  • Noir
  • Cairo
  • Go
  • Solidity

Open-source tools

  • zkbugs (reproducible ZK circuit bugs)
  • clean (Lean DSL for formally verified ZK circuits)

Anchor: #ca-zksecurity

Key works library

How this list is built

Researchers drew each entry from public evidence. A second person who did not write it then opened every report, checked authorship, scope and dates, and traced each strength and watch-out to a source. Pricing is an editorial estimate relative to the other firms. Nobody pays to be listed.

  • Each firm’s public audit-report repository, read at the report level.
  • Client disclosures, conference research (Real World Crypto, IACR) and the firms’ own tools.
  • Independent coverage, including post-audit incidents where reputably reported. An audit is not a guarantee of security.

Spotted an error, a missing firm or a newer report? Email us with a link and we update the entry.

What the key works cover

Number of linked works touching each area. One work can cover several. Bars are to scale.

  1. 1ZK proofs71
  2. 2Cryptographic libraries60
  3. 3Signatures49
  4. 4Hashing & commitments22
  5. 5MPC / threshold signatures20
  6. 6Key management & HSM17
  7. 7Side-channel & hardware17
  8. 8Post-quantum14
  9. 9Smart-contract cryptography13
  10. 10Formal verification13
  11. 11Bridges & light clients11
  12. 12TLS & secure channels10

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